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Differences in social protection across countries have received greater atten-
tion as national economies have become more interconnected through trade
and finance. It has been shown that different levels of social protection are
factors shaping the competitive position of national partners in an economic
union (Abraham 1991). The long-term productivity of a nation's export sectors
may be influenced favorably or unfavorably by social protection. To illustrate,
well-designed income insurance (Friedman 1953; Stafford 1977; Varian 1980;
Milgrom and Roberts 1992) can encourage productive division of labor
and improve the market performance of an economy. On the other hand, some
policymakers see a minimal level of social protection and insurance as a
way to realize gains in competition with countries having more-generous
systems. This has created concern in European countries over England's per-
ceived move toward reduced social insurance.
Recent work has emphasized the idea that a country's wage growth will de-
pend on the difference between the rate of growth of its own export sector
productivity and productivity growth in the corresponding sectors of its com-
petitors (Krugman 1979; Johnson and Stafford 1992, 1993). In the basic
Johnson-Stafford model of world trade (with unitary price and income elastici-
ties of demand), the real wage can be expressed as an increasing function of
the country's own productivity in its exportables and its nontraded goods sector
and as a decreasing function of the productivity of its competitors in its ex-
portables. If the social protection system acts either as a force improving the
productivity of the different sectors of an economy on the one hand or as a
costly burden on the other (e.g., U.S. health insurance), the system will affect
a country's position in world trade and thereby its standard of living.
Siv Gustafsson is professor of economics at the University of Amsterdam. Frank P. Stafford is
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Childcare arrangements shape the payoff to educational quality, a particular
interest in the advanced industrial economies. Preschool experiences are of
major significance for cognitive function in children, so childcare arrange-
ments have an important impact on long-term growth and competitiveness,
even if the links are difficult to measure. At the same time, childcare arrange-
ments enable women to realize the market payoff from their formal schooling.
There is an emerging view that advanced industrial economies need a well-
trained career work force in order to compete in world markets and that women
will constitute a growing share of such workers. But for women with children
to have lifetime labor market careers, they need to obtain child care to permit
the career development and on-the-job training emphasized in life-cycle theo-
ries of human capital formation. Otherwise, they can be expected to have a
shallow labor market profile: attenuated skill formation, fewer market hours,
and early retirement (Ryder, Stafford, and Stephan 1976, 666). A paucity of
resources for child care could be consistent with career development but would
have long-term costs for the well-being of the children and their development.
On the other hand, child care uses both market and nonmarket resources, and
some extensive programs and family sacrifices to attain better child well-being
may facilitate added market work that is just not worth the cost.
In this paper, we study the nature and functioning of the childcare market
and childcare policies in Sweden, the Netherlands and the United States. These
three countries, despite being at what might be regarded as similar levels of
industrialization, have dramatically different regimes under which families se-
cure child care to facilitate labor market activity of young women. Perceived
economic pressures and wage slowdowns in all three countries will undoubt-
edly shape the debate on the expansion or reduction of the public policy role
in these and other areas of social protection.
Our thesis is that to understand both the context and features of these spe-
cific programs, one needs a broader framework to understand the historical and
conceptual origins of the welfare concept in each country. As outlined in sec-
tion 11.1, the welfare concept, in turn, shapes the system of social protection
and its modification in light of emerging economic forces. From this outline,
section 11.2 provides a historical interpretation of the welfare regime concept
developed in each of the three countries and then describes the salient features
of current childcare, leave, and related policies.
Section 11.3 presents the basic descriptive differences in the use of public
programs and market and informal arrangements that constitute the childcare
subsystem of the larger social welfare system in the three countries. In this
section, we summarize some of the existing research findings on the use of the
systems and, utilizing three separate microdata sets (one for each country),
provide some comparative differences in earnings growth and behavioral re-
sponses in terms of labor force participation and price sensitivity. In section
11.4, we offer a brief conclusion.335 Three Regimes of Child Care: The U.S., the Netherlands, and Sweden
11.1 Different Welfare Regimes
In simplest form, the three social protection, or welfare, regimes that apply
to these three countries are residual, institutional (or consensus), and corporate
(Esping-Andersen 1990).
11.1.1 Residual
In the residual welfare state conception of the United States, the state is
involved only when the family or market fails, and this is presumed to apply
to a small share, or residual, of the population. Programs such as Head Start
and the Family Support Act of 1988 are centered on the idea that intervention
is needed to encourage "positive effects of preschool on disadvantaged chil-
dren" and that the "needs of employed mothers [be met] while providing devel-
opmentally appropriate experiences for children" (Hofferth et al. 1991, 8).
While there is some public support for child care extending beyond lower-
middle income groups, this support is in the form of tax credits. Tax credits as
a policy allow minimum government involvement and facilitate a wide range
of choice in the market. Guarantees of unpaid leave have been opposed on the
grounds that the firm and its employees can form private agreements on an
individualized market basis.
11.1.2 Institutional, or Consensus
The virtual opposite of the residualist approach is the case of an institutional
welfare state such as Sweden and other Scandinavian countries. There pro-
grams such as parental leave and child care are regarded as being available for
everyone—in principle, although in practice the more educated are more likely
to avoid being rationed from spaces (Gustafsson and Stafford 1992). The ser-
vice provided is regarded as essential and universal; the belief is that if it were
not available, some parents and children would be denied a basic component
of the standard of living.
11.1.3 Corporate
The corporate welfare state is seen as one in which the social policy is
shaped by the interplay of powerful political interest groups. In the case of the
Netherlands, the rather modest public daycare program and features of related
policies affecting women in the job market are seen as the result of conflicting,
historical interests of the church. Both Catholics and Protestants feared that a
high birthrate of the rival religion would undermine their political power; for
this reason, both interests had a family perspective and supported policies to
increase fertility.
Based on the distinction between residual and institutional welfare states
(Titmuss 1958), we might expect different responses to emerging economic
pressures. Under the market approach, a political minority dependent on public336 Siv Gustafsson and Frank P. Stafford
benefits may lose out when economic pressure redirects attention to the well-
being of the majority. Witness the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign proposals
to enact "tax cuts for the middle class." In the consensus case, with slow eco-
nomic growth, pressure to cut back spending to balance the budget may be
more than offset by pressure to expand the program coverage and serve more
broadly, even if per user benefits are reduced somewhat.
Our empirical work verifies that the Netherlands as a corporate-style regime
is more than just an "in-between" case. In the context of encouraging the fam-
ily, the church saw market work as inhibiting the size and character of the
traditional family, so policies to encourage women's market work were not de-
veloped in the Netherlands.
1 Research indicates that even today the small pub-
lic daycare program in the Netherlands is used about equally by labor market
participants and by nonparticipants (Groot and Maassen van den Brink 1992)
and that a woman's religious orientation has a measurable impact on labor force
participation in the Netherlands but not in the United States (section 11.3.3).
In contrast, the extensive Swedish parental leave and daycare programs are
for the nearly exclusive use of labor market participants, and religion plays a
minor role.
Comparing across the three countries, there is a type of consistency among
the set of policies in each country. The result of the corporatist interplay in
Holland was not just the shaping of a given policy but the character of a set of
related policies: marriage bars on women's market work (historically), the lim-
ited extent of parental leave benefits, and public day care. The Swedish parental
leave and childcare and related programs (including taxes) fit together and are
part of the country's overall system.
The great social policy differences across what one might assume to be
countries with rather similar levels of industrialization can be seen in the over-
view comparisons of the three countries and other industrialized nations from
a recent study (Sundstrom and Stafford 1992, presented as table 11.1). We feel
that understanding some of the reasons for these broad intercountry differences
is essential. The approach of simply assessing the traditional responses to pol-
icy parameters, which is common in the literature of economic evaluation, is
not sufficient.
11.2 Childcare Policies: Origins and Differences
Public childcare programs in the United States are very rare and are operated
at the local level. The main policies supporting child care are tax deductibility
of childcare expenses on federal tax schedules and some modest state supple-
ments (Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel 1992). Only recently has very
1. This is quite apart from the validity of the implicit hypothesis that market work need limit
fertility over the range observed across industrialized economies. Both Ireland and Sweden cur-
rently have very high total fertility rates, over 2.0, but the labor force participation of women is
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limited legislation allowing women to take unpaid leave from an employer
been proposed and enacted (Family Leave Act). Until the 1950s it was com-
mon for there to be marriage and maternity bars on women's employment (Gol-
din 1990). In contrast, the right to unpaid maternal leave at childbirth dates
back to 1939 in Sweden (Sundstrom and Stafford 1992; Gustafsson 1984), and
paid leave dates back to 1962 (Gustafsson 1984).
From the perspective of most U.S. economists, even those in the field of
human resources, the rationale for public provision of childcare services is
seen as very weak. The usual justification for government intervention is to
correct market failures arising from public goods or externalities. In addition,
there is sometimes a case made for social insurance on the grounds of adverse
selection and contract compliance in private markets. This is the implicit and
sometimes explicit logic for unemployment insurance. Perhaps the closest jus-
tification for public child care would be as a merit good or to correct an exter-
nality arising from insufficient resources devoted to child care under choices
made by individual parents or families.
This contemporary U.S. perspective on child care is consistent with the view
of Nassau Senior, who was responsible for reforming the Poor Laws, and later
Manchester liberals who emphasized individual choice and argued that social
protection be offered in terms of cash payments (Esping-Andersen 1990, 10).
In terms of the residualist approach discussed by Titmuss (1958), the market
and family are regarded as the main and preponderant sources of such services;
only those who cannot use the market or who have family problems are seen
as needing public services.
It has been argued that the extent to which economic goods are provided
through the public sector will depend on the variance in consumption prefer-
ences of voters. If there is a great deal of variance, consensus about what and
how much to consume via public provision, even of purely public goods, will
be difficult to achieve, and a greater reliance will be placed on the market
(Buchanan and Tullock 1965).
Given a lack of consensus about the appropriate form and level of resources
for preschool children, public child care in the United States is often discussed
solely as an antipoverty program for lower-income groups to ensure child de-
velopment and/or to enable women on welfare to become self-sufficient via
labor market skills. Virtually all U.S. programs with this concept have small
benefit levels, are applicable only to a narrowly defined eligible population,
and are often proposed to be converted to a cash basis (Rainwater, Rein, and
Schwartz 1986).
Contributory social insurance programs in the United States provide a sharp
contrast to such programs for the poor. Social Security is close to universally
applicable (with some anomalous exceptions such as federal civil servants) and
is close to being politically sacred. The level of revenues from Social Security
and other payroll taxes to fund social insurance (including unemployment and
disability insurance) are almost as large as those from personal income taxes.340 Siv Gustafsson and Frank P. Stafford
Yet there has been little in the way of calls to scale back these social insurance
programs. The reason appears to be that benefits are based on contributions,
and though some receive actuarial present values of benefits in excess of contri-
butions, there is a sufficient element of insurance that the system is not re-
garded as an income transfer program.
The potential relevance of the Social Security experience for public child
care is that public child care is unlikely to get much support as a policy in the
United States unless it is relatively universal. Possibly, public child care could
be offered on a contributory basis if those who used it would face & future tax
surcharge rate to pay off the cost for their children. Another design element
that could be attractive from the U.S. perspective is to make child care a cash
benefit via the tax system, and much of what has been done is along these
lines, via tax deductibility of childcare expenses. Without design elements em-
phasizing private choice and a contributory connection to benefits received,
public child care or parental leave is unlikely to get much support as a policy
in the United States.
While the United States was historically a leader in developing free public
education,
2 the family and market orientation seems to have been a continuing
factor shaping policy toward very young children. Care of preschool children
was regarded as a public obligation only in cases of poverty, widowhood, or
family abandonment of children. The main dialogue was over the question of
whether aid should be outside the home (in orphanages or the poorhouse) or
within the home.
A major change was the shift toward an in-home approach during the Pro-
gressive era (1900-17) (Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986, 97) with mother-only
families receiving cash benefits on the condition that the child be living in a
"suitable home," defined diversely to include religious training, school perfor-
mance of the child, and absence of male boarders. Very seldom did black
families receive benefits, and there were usually restrictions on benefits to
never-married women. That only a small share of the population received any
benefits is consistent with the residualist hypothesis about the nature of U.S.
welfare programs. Market work of the mother was not a major objective of
these early programs of aid to dependent children.
Contemporary U.S. policy discussion has focused on market-based expan-
sions of child care with emphasis on family need. The Child Care and Develop-
ment Block Grant passed by the 101st Congress in October 1990 authorized
new grants to states to fund childcare assistance to low- and moderate-income
families (Hofferth and Wissoker 1992), an expansion of existing tax credits for
low-income parents, and added funding for Head Start (Golonka and Ooms
1991). This set of new initiatives can be classified into price reductions, in-
2. As of 1803, the state of Ohio had begun the movement toward free public education in the
United States. By 1848 virtually all of the United States had mandatory, free public education,
well ahead of most European countries (Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986).341 Three Regimes of Child Care: The U.S., the Netherlands, and Sweden
come increases, and subsidies for quality of child care. Consistent with long-
standing traditions, these initiatives are seen as only for the use of the segment
of the population with limited income, and the actual services are purchased
through the market and not from government providers.
The current U.S. childcare system is, for most parents, a market- and family-
based system and one that is very diverse in terms of the methods used for
child care. Of employed women with preschool-age children, 30 percent are
cared for primarily by a parent, 26 percent in centers, (childcare centers, nurs-
ery schools) 19 percent in family day care, 18 percent by other relatives, 4
percent by an in-home provider, and the balance (3 percent) by other forms of
care (Hofferth et al. 1991). The use of centers and family day care is much
higher for women working full time (54 percent) than for those working part
time (31 percent), which in turn is higher than for those not employed (17
percent).
In sharp contrast to the United States and the Netherlands, Sweden has a
very extensive program of day care and parental leave. Some influences of
distant history have shaped today's policy, but the large-scale expansion of pub-
lic day care and parental leave dates from more recent times, primarily 1974
on. Here we will offer some brief remarks on the social history of the Nether-
lands and Sweden that has shaped the context for modern policy in these coun-
tries.
Our view is that much of the difference in the current-day systems is
historical-cultural and connects to the Esping-Andersen thesis of distinct re-
gimes of social protection. This thesis contrasts with the usual functional ap-
proach of most economic thinking, which emphasizes system design as the
result of solving a problem: if all three countries have industrial market econo-
mies, one would expect similarity in the problems and therefore in the solu-
tions. However, there may not be a strong uniqueness to the solution of com-
mon problems; in addition, path dependence in the form of history can be
important even if there is some "best" way.
In this historical, or path-dependent, context the difference between Sweden
and the Netherlands is fascinating. At the time of the Reformation, the Swedish
political leader, Gustav Wasa, believed that he could consolidate his power by
creating a uniformly Protestant country. This he accomplished over the period
1526-41, shortly after Martin Luther began the Reformation in 1517 in Wit-
tenberg, Germany. In the Netherlands there was a protracted standoff between
Protestants and Catholics that persisted for centuries and that divided, or "col-
umnized," all aspects of economic and social life with separate banks, universi-
ties (the "free" in the Free University of Amsterdam meant free to pursue in-
struction according to the principles of the Dutch Reformed Church),
companies, unions, neighborhoods, and social clubs. For fear of losing politi-
cal control, both factions resisted anything perceived as reducing their constit-
uency, and this persisted after World War II.
In this setting, a whole collection of policies evolved predicated on preserv-342 Siv Gustafsson and Frank P. Stafford
ing a strong traditional family and, it was believed, high fertility. The labor
market activity of Dutch married women was regarded as competing with these
family values, and this contributed to enactment of overt restrictions on wom-
en's employment. For example, married female schoolteachers were dismissed
under a 1934 provision (van Kessel, Kuperus, and Pott-Buter 1986). The Neth-
erlands did, in fact, have higher fertility until quite recently. As of the late
1960s, the total fertility rate was above 2.5 in the Netherlands and below 2.0
in Sweden (Gustafsson 1992b).
Since the 1970s, religion has had reduced scope in Dutch politics, and fertil-
ity has declined (see table 11.1). Market work of younger women has risen
dramatically in the 1980s. As of 1990, 82 percent of married women under age
40 without children were labor market participants, compared to 28 percent of
those aged 40 to 66 (OSA 1991). Yet certain traditional elements remain.
Women with young children are not supported extensively by special public
policies, and market participation and hours of these women are very low.
A modern watershed in Swedish labor market policy for women dates back
to the 1930s. Just as in the Netherlands (but for other reasons, such as migra-
tion to the United States and persistently weak performance in the agricultural
sector), there was concern over possible depopulation. The Great Depression
accentuated these depopulation fears and fueled the belief that women's em-
ployment was at the expense of men's jobs. What is surprising is the turn of
events in which Alva Myrdal was able to argue for labor market programs for
women. As head of a committee on women's labor market policy, she advanced
the principle that mothers should have the right to participate in the labor mar-
ket and that policies to accomplish this were needed (Gustafsson 1992a). What
in fact has evolved from this conception is a system of benefit for the joint
condition of market work and fertility.
This belief is implicit in the design of the current Swedish system: simply
working without children means that one loses out on extensive benefits, and
simply having children without labor market attachment implies a low standard
of living. In addition to providing a maximum monetary payoff to joint work
and fertility, the benefits are unrelated to family structure: unmarried women
and married women receive the same benefits so long as they work in the mar-
ket and have children.
The personal income tax is based on the separate earnings of the husband
and wife. Given separate taxation combined with strong progressivity, there
are general incentives for market work (Gustafsson 1992b). Combining the
influence of the tax system with child-dependent benefits, the full effect of the
Swedish system is to encourage fertility and a career or lifetime commitment
to the labor market by women. While the system is often criticized on the
grounds that it discourages the traditional, two-parent family, at least for pre-
school children there does not appear to be a problem: as of 1984 over 90
percent of preschoolers lived with both biological parents (Gustafsson and
Stafford 1992).343 Three Regimes of Child Care: The U.S., the Netherlands, and Sweden
We find the regimes approach useful in gaining an initial understanding of
the dramatic system differences across the three countries. As with any classi-
fication, however, this approach brings with it some danger of overcategorizing
or stereotyping the system differences. Clearly there are pressures to recon-
sider the scope and design of the Swedish system in light of arguments con-
cerning allocative efficiency. To illustrate, it has been argued that for a given
total daycare subsidy, it would be better to reduce the per child subsidy, raise
the parents' copayment, and end the extensive rationing (Gustafsson and
Stafford 1992, 214-15). On the other side of the spectrum, there has been
rising concern over the developmental well-being of young children of low-
income, single-parent families in the United States. Early development is seen
as shaping subsequent school performance and grade completed, and there is
a remarkably strong relationship between crime and school completion for
young people (U.S. Department of Labor 1992).
Because of its distinctive features, we will discuss the contemporary Swed-
ish system and its policy elements in some detail. The existing parental leave
program dates from 1974, when parental leave was extended to fathers and the
benefit level was raised to 90 percent of gross earnings up to a ceiling.
3 As can
be seen in table 11.1, parental leave benefits are for fifty-two weeks at 90 per-
cent of one's prior labor earnings, and another thirteen weeks of benefits are
available at SKr 60 per day (about $10). The system allows either parent to
draw benefits; to encourage greater use by men, starting in 1980 it has had a
small special portion available for fathers only ("daddy days"). The program
is strongly tied to labor market hours and therefore to labor earnings. For this
reason, it is not sensible to think of the leave program as needs based. In fact,
those with no earnings history receive a small "flat payment" (SKr 60 per day
as of 1990), which has not kept pace with inflation since 1974 when it was
introduced (at SKr 25 per day).
Figure 11.1 presents the time line of parenting leave benefit policy provis-
ions from 1974 to 1990. The modifications in 1980 were the most significant
in terms of scope and coverage of the program. The level of benefits is based
on past earnings over an eligibility interval. The eligibility period was extended
to twenty-four months in 1980 and then to thirty months in 1986, and this had
a major impact on program use. The time extension makes it possible realisti-
cally to plan the birth of two children in succession. During this protracted
period out of the labor force, benefits will equal 90 percent of pay rather than
the modest amount received under the flat payment. The parental leave pro-
gram extensions combined with the daycare system are regarded as having
created a fertility boom in Sweden; as can be seen in table 11.1, Swedish fertil-
ity was on the same order as Irish fertility in 1988, and by 1992 the Swedish
3. The ceiling was applicable to only about 1 percent of women and 10 percent of men as of
1985 (Sundstrom and Stafford 1992). Contact days are those allowed for arranging schedules with
employers, daycare centers, or schools.344 Siv Gustafsson and Frank P. Stafford
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Figure 11.1 Developments in parental leave benefits in Sweden, 1974-1990
Source: National Insurance Board, various publications. Figure adapted from Sunstrom and
Stafford (1992).
Note: SEK = SKr (Swedish crowns).
"Total number of paid leave days (days at the flat rate are in parentheses). On 1 January, 1980,
days with full pay were increased to 270; On 1 July, 90 days at the flat rate were added.
bBefore 1980, benefit days were counted per family with children under age 10; since 1980,
benefit days are counted per child under age 12.
'Maximum number of months between births for mother to remain at least at the benefit level of
the previous birth.
fertility rate had edged up still further, with added births concentrated among
older and more-educated women.
The contemporary daycare system in Sweden also was established in the
1960s and expanded from the mid-1970s on. It is primarily available to moth-
ers of preschool children after parental leave and prior to the start of grade
school at age 6-7. Eligibility is based on "substantial" market work (com-
monly twenty or more hours per week), and in most local communities the fee
paid is partly needs or income based. As can be seen in table 11.2, the system
is very expensive per child (about SKr 60,000 per year, or $10,000), and the
copayment by the family averages only about 10 percent of the cost, or less
than $100 per month, for very high quality day care.
The number of spaces available in community childcare centers or
community-sponsored homes has risen from about 15 percent of the children
ages 0-6 to 47 percent in 1987, where it has stayed (approximately) since. In
1977 there was a shift toward central (state) matched funding, and until 1984
the matching formula to the local community was a combined 50 percent from
the central government. From 1984 the central government funding formula
was modified to SKr 22,000 per child and SKr 30,000 per childcare worker.
With a ratio of one worker per four children, the per-child subsidy to the com-










































































































Source: Arbete och Loner. S. Gustaffson and P. Lantz, (1985), (Stockholm: Industrial Institute for
Economic and Social Research and Arbetslivscentrum).
aThe figures in parentheses are conversion of the nominal SKr to common 1986 prices.
The share paid by the local community is on the order of 40 percent, and
the fee paid by the parents, while averaging 10 percent, varies across communi-
ties and among families with different incomes, as illustrated for four commu-
nities in Figure 11.2. Other communities are simply represented by the two
endpoints (minimum and maximum) of their income-based fee schedules. In
communities with a sliding scale, families at the lowest income levels will
commonly pay only 3 percent or 4 percent of the total cost, while the highest-
income families will be paying about 40 percent of the cost per space. Under
the sliding scale (as with the four communities illustrated, with the exception
of Danderyd), the parents' share rises with income up to a ceiling, beyond
which there is no added copayment. Rationing of spaces is common: at the set
price in the local community, a higher share of the eligible population would
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Figure 11.2 Monthly public day care price in Swedish communities for families
of differing monthly incomes.
that parents with professional occupations are far more likely to surmount
the rationing barrier than are blue-collar parents (Gustafsson and Stafford
1992, 215).
A fascinating aspect of the daycare system in Sweden is its broad political
support. The extent of the daycare program and the rate of parental copayment
are subject to control by the 285 local communities, which (as has been noted)
pay an approximate average of 40 percent of the cost. What is surprising is that
in local communities not under majority control of the Social Democrats (who
have championed the program), there are on average only two fewer spaces per
one hundred children (Gustafsson and Stafford 1992, table 2). Evidently, there
is a broad consensus that public day care should be available, and this applies
to parental leave as well.
11.3 Patterns of Childcare Arrangements in the Three Countries
11.3.1 Research Findings
Research on the childcare arrangements in the three countries shows major
differences in its availability and use in conjunction with labor force participa-
tion. Distinctive features of child care in the United States and the Netherlands
include use of multiple modes or, particularly in the United States, arranging
parental schedules to allow parental presence throughout the day (Ribar 1992,
145; Groot and Maasen van den Brink 1992, table 3; U.S. Department of Labor
1992a, table 2). In Sweden, families with a space in the public daycare system347 Three Regimes of Child Care: The U.S., the Netherlands, and Sweden
generally use this as the primary childcare arrangement (Gustafsson and
Stafford 1992). For women with children under 18 months of age, paid paren-
tal leave with the mother providing the primary child care is the dominant
option used (Sundstrom and Stafford 1992).
In contrast to the use of mothers' own time for very young children in Swe-
den, mothers in the United States are likely to return to the job market very
soon after the birth of a child. Data from the female youth sample of the Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey for 1988 (at which time the women in the sample
were ages 23-30) show that close to half of the women with a child under the
age of 2 were employed and that over half of these women were working thirty-
five hours a week or more. This pattern has been highlighted recently (Leibo-
witz, Klerman, and Waite 1992, 127, table 3) and raises concerns over possible
stresses on the family and the child. As we recall from section 11.2, a parent
or other family member is the primary care provider for 30 percent of pre-
schoolers even when the mother is employed full time. For those employed
part time, 61 percent have the parent or other family member as the primary
care provider. This has been discussed in the United States, particularly by the
popular press, under the general heading of "time squeeze."
Studies based on U.S. time diaries show that educated women are likely
simultaneously to work substantially in the job market, to devote a great deal
of time to direct child care, and to take on added housework associated with
preschool children. The net result is an obvious decline in sleep and free time
(Hill and Stafford 1985). Specifically, married women college graduates with
a preschooler under age 2 devoted about ten hours a week to child care and
another seven hours per week to added housework. Yet market time was re-
duced only about seven hours a week (as of 1976). Given the fundamental time
constraint, there have to be some other time use reductions. About seven hours
of the ten-hour deficit (10 + 7 — 7= 10) were made up for by a reduction in
passive leisure and sleep, implying a time squeeze and presumed stress for
these women. The rest of the time was "financed" from a variety of alternative
time uses.
While generally similar patterns are observed for educated women in Israel,
(Gronau 1992), there has not been, overall, a postwar trend toward a time
squeeze for women in the United States or Israel. A possible reversal of this
may now be taking place, as the average real wage in the United States has
stagnated and declined since the mid-1970s (Bound and Johnson 1992). More-
over, the growth of single-parent, female-headed households has raised many
questions about the well-being of these mothers and children (Garfinkel and
McLanahan 1986,14 and 48), given that the poverty rate for mother-only fami-
lies is on the order of 50 percent and their earnings capacity is typically very
low. Is it the case that both married women and single mothers return quickly
to the job market in the United States, with educated women seeking to ensure
better career earnings and the single mothers with low education simply trying
to make ends meet?348 Siv Gustafsson and Frank P. Stafford
11.3.2 Descriptive Differences in Labor Supply of Women with Young
Children
For the purpose of comparing the three countries, we constructed tables of
labor force participation and hours for young women, by age of preschool
child. For the United States, where there is special concern over the economic
status of mother-only families, the data are presented for single women sepa-
rately.
From comparisons across tables 11.3-11.6, some of the intercountry differ-
ences and program impacts can be seen.
4 In contrast to the United States,
where a high percentage of women are at work soon after giving birth, the level
of participation and work hours of Swedish women with children under age 2
is far lower, almost 40 percent lower than for women with older preschoolers.
In contrast to U.S. women, time diary data for Sweden show a fifteen-hour
decline in market work per week and an increase in free-time activities of
women with babies in the household (Klevmarken and Flood 1989). Rest and
personal care consume three hours more per week for Swedish mothers when
there are preschoolers under age 2—in contrast to the decline in personal care
and sleep of U.S. mothers. This suggests much less time pressure on Swedish
women with young preschoolers (Klevmarken and Flood 1990).
On the other hand, comparing tables 11.3 and 11.6, by the time the youngest
preschooler is age 2 many Swedish women have secured a place for the child
in the public daycare system, and the participation rate of these women is much
higher than in the United States. Given the sharply progressive tax rates that
prevailed in Sweden as of 1984, as well as the legal right to work shorter hours
(to a six-hour workday) with job protection, we see far fewer Swedish women
working thirty-five or more hours per week in the labor market when preschool
children are present. Although Swedish women with 2- and 3-year-olds aver-
age somewhat higher market hours than comparable U.S. women, the U.S.
women are more than twice as likely to work thirty-four hours per week or
more.
As of 1985 the overall Dutch female labor force participation rate for women
with preschoolers was only 27 percent, well below the rate in the Scandinavian
countries and the United States (Pott-Buter 1993). In addition, hours of work
for those working were low, and there was the continuation of a long tradition
of volunteer work by married women. It is possible that the low correlation
between use of formal day care and market work is the consequence of the
prevailing view (as in Germany; see Braun, Scott, and Alwin 1992) that full-
time parenting was the best lifestyle for women. As its corresponding embodi-
4. Assessing data from the Netherlands requires that careful attention be given to the age of the
women and time period of any sample used. This is because there has been a dramatic increase in
participation among younger women in recent years (OSA 1991). For example, a new sample of
six thousand families in the Dutch population shows the following labor force participation rates
for mothers with children in specified age ranges: under age 1, 39.7 percent; age 1, 41.7 percent;

























































































































Source: National Longitudinal Surveys, Young Women Age 23-30 as of 1988.
merit in public policy, this view has elements ranging from eligibility for the
small public day care for women not in the labor market to tax deductions for
dependent children (until 1990).
Table 11.5 shows the very low participation rates for women with preschool-
ers under age 2. While the U.S. participation rate is 46 percent, in the Nether-
lands it is 26 percent for those with children under age 1 and 22 percent for
those with a child age 1-1.99 years. These participation rates, about half the
corresponding U.S. rates, occur despite fairly similar public policies (with the
possible exception of paid child leave for sixteen weeks in the Netherlands (see






































































Source: OSA Survey, Women Age 16-65 as of 1988.



































































Source: HUS Survey, Women Age 18-64 as of 1984.
tion rate remains below 40 percent, and hours of market work of those who
work are rarely in excess of thirty-five hours in the Netherlands. Only about 6
percent of Dutch women with children under age 6 work more than thirty-five
hours per week in the market. This labor supply pattern is consistent with the
finding that the Netherlands and Japan had a similar near-constancy in house-
work hours of women over the period 1960-80, while in other industrialized
countries there was a strong movement away from housework and toward mar-
ket work (Juster and Stafford 1991, table 6).351 Three Regimes of Child Care: The U.S., the Netherlands, and Sweden
The three countries differ dramatically in the percentage of preschoolers in
mother-only families. In the Netherlands 4.6 percent of our sample was
mother-only cases; in Sweden special census tabulations place this at 11.0 per-
cent; in the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) sample, 28.0 percent of
the mothers were not married or living in a consensual union.
11.3.3 Econometric Analysis of Labor Force Participation
Wage Regressions
Based on our three microdata samples of women with young children, we
have sought to portray some of the salient differences in women's labor market
payoffs to work and education and how wage opportunities, family status, and
childcare costs influence market participation. Given that most Dutch women
have to arrange child care without much in the way of public policy, we esti-
mated a simple model of responsiveness of daycare use to market price. What
we find is that simple models of labor market behavior show many differences
across the countries.
To begin, we examined the market payoff to education and work experience.
Table 11.7 displays wage regressions for the three countries. The wage variable
in the U.S. data is before-tax wage, whereas the Dutch data provide informa-
tion only on after-tax monthly earnings. In the Swedish data there is informa-
tion on before-tax wage, and use of previous work (Gustafsson 1992b) allows
us to compute the after-tax wage in order to make comparisons with the Dutch
data. In both the Swedish and Dutch data, we included women age 45 and
younger. A limitation in comparing those results with the U.S. results is that
the age range in the NLS only went up to age 30. The Swedish sample size is
quite small, and limiting the sample size to include only women 33 years of
age and younger would have been too restrictive.
The wage regressions are standard Mincer (1974) earnings functions; we
expect education and labor market experience to be the most important explan-
atory variables. The Dutch data do not include information on years of labor
market experience; after some experimentation with ages of the children as an
indicator of experience, we opted for age of the woman and number of family
members as explanatory variables in the Dutch wage regression. The results of
the wage regressions show that there is much more wage variation in the
United States than in the Netherlands or Sweden.
Both high school and college education carry a higher wage premium in the
United States than in the other two countries. Also, work experience carries a
much higher wage premium in the United States than in Sweden, but this may
partly reflect the higher payoff to experience early in one's career, since the
U.S. sample is younger and less experienced. The average length of labor force
experience in the United States is less than a year, compared to thirteen years
in Sweden.
In appendix table 11A.1, the means of variables are given. It turns out that
the distribution over educational groups between the three countries is very352 Siv Gustafsson and Frank P. Stafford


















































































Sources: United States: NLS/4; The Netherlands: OSA; Sweden: HUS.
Note: Ln (w) = Natural logarithm of wage.
"Wage variable is before-tax wage.
bWage variable is net after taxes.
CI = Before-tax wage; II = Net after tax.
unequal. In the United States, almost everyone has completed high school. In
Sweden and the Netherlands, about one-third fall into this group. In both the
United States and the Netherlands, about 22 percent have completed college.
It is difficult to say if these differences are real or an effect of definitions of
education used in the different samples (see appendix A). However, given that
college completion is more selective in Sweden than in the United States, it is
of note that the payoff to college education of women in the United States
exceeds the payoff in Sweden.
Participation Regressions
The sample means of labor force participation of young married women
in the three countries are 72 percent in the United States, 49 percent in the
Netherlands, and 82 percent in Sweden (see table 11.8). In all three countries,353 Three Regimes of Child Care: The U.S., the Netherlands, and Sweden
Table 11.8 Participation Equations (Logit): Married Women under 45 Years of







Child age 0-2 (= 1)
Child age 3-5 (= 1)
Number of children 0-12
Husband unemployed (= 1)
Goes to church (=1)























































































Sources: United States: NLS/Y; The Netherlands: OSA; Sweden: HUS.
Note: Labor force participation = At least one hour paid work per week.
"Women ages 23-30 in 1988.
bOSA data net after taxes.
CI = Before-tax wage; II = Net after tax.
husband's income has a negative effect and wife's wage a positive effect on
participation, as we would expect.
5 The Swedish after-tax regression performs
better than the before-tax regression. Theoretically, people should be making
decisions on the basis of their after-tax wage and income, and Swedish income
tax rates in 1984 were both high and progressive. On the other hand, net wages
are endogenous to the hours-of-work decision. Yet, since our dependent vari-
able is to work at least one hour for pay in the survey week, this endogenity is
less of a problem.
In all three countries, the impact of children under age 3 is to significantly
lower labor force participation; this effect is most pronounced in Sweden,
5. The Dutch earnings data are after tax, and the equation should be compared to the second
Swedish wage regression.354 Siv Gustafsson and Frank P. Stafford
where the generous parental leave program has its impact. Children ages 3 to
5 have a far smaller impact on participation, and only in the Netherlands does
the number of children under 13 years of age decrease mothers' labor force
participation significantly. We believe this to be fairly strong support for the
hypothesis that long-standing beliefs about the mother's obligation to a full-
time childcare commitment holds sway over labor market behavior of Dutch
women. The most telling comparison is with U.S. women, since the parental
leave policy in the Netherlands is among the United States husbands 10.5 per-
cent were unemployed according to this definition. In the Swedish data there
are fourteen husbands who received unemployment benefits. All of them have
working wives, and the variable could not therefore be included.
Finally, for Sweden we included an index of availability of community day
care in the community where the mother lives. The variable is not significant,
but controlling for this variable increases the t-values of the wage and income
variables.
Price Sensitivity ofDaycare Use and Mothers Work
In table 11.9, for Dutch women, we present an ordered probit regression on
whether the respondent would increase the use of day care if the price were
lower. The higher the husband's income, the less likely the mother is to be
price sensitive in the use of day care. If she is religious, she is also less likely to
respond to lower daycare price, although the coefficient is not quite significant.
Family resources, represented by husband's income, and religious outlook, rep-
resented by church attendance, have an apparent and jointly discouraging ef-
fect on market work of Dutch women limited to fourteen weeks (in contrast to
sixty-five weeks in Sweden).
The view that historical and cultural influences matter is supported further
by the impact of religious activity on labor force participation of Dutch
women. In the Netherlands, women who attend church are less likely to partici-
pate in the labor market. The definition of the variable is "goes to church at
least once a month," and 26 percent of the Dutch mothers do so. There is an
NLS/y variable based on an identically phrased question, and 52 percent of the
women in our sample go to church at least once a month. There is no apparent
relation between church attendance and labor market participation in the
United States.
In the Netherlands, unemployment benefits are dependent on family income,
and the participation equation shows that Dutch women whose husbands are
unemployed (7 percent of the sample) participate significantly less in the labor
market than other women. This is consistent with the hypothesis of a "poverty
trap" in the Dutch tax and social security system (Gustafsson and Bruyn-Hundt
1991), which is also present in the British social security system. In England,
the husband's unemployment has similarly strong negative effects on wife's
labor force participation.
A "husband unemployed" variable in the U.S. regression shows a negative355 Three Regimes of Child Care: The U.S., the Netherlands, and Sweden
Table 11.9 Price Sensitivity for Day Care in the Netherlands: Women with
Children under 12 (asymptotic /-values in parentheses)
Price query: Would you use more day care if the price were lower?
Response Percentage Observed
No(= 1)







Husband's monthly income (X 1,000)
Labor force participation (hours > 0)
Child age 0-2 (= 1)
Uses child care (= 1)
































but not statistically significant effect on wife's labor force participation. The
unemployment definition was "husband has no earnings," and insofar as these
variables would lower the willingness to utilize day care even if the price were
lower. On the other hand, for those who do use child care, a lower price would
lead to more use. This parallels the well-established result for the U.S.
childcare market (Ribar 1992; Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel 1992)
and for user response to the variation in copayment rate in the Swedish public
childcare system (Gustafsson and Stafford 1992). Further, using an approach
similar to that of Ribar (1992) for U.S. data, the substantial price sensitivity of
daycare use and mother's work is observed in a recent study of the Netherlands
(Groot and Maassen van den Brink 1992).
11.4 Conclusion
Comparisons have shown that among these three advanced industrialized
countries, the policies and practices of child care and labor supply of women
with young children differ dramatically. Partly, these differences arise from356 Siv Gustafsson and Frank P. Stafford
historical differences in broad social institutions (Stafford and Robinson
1990). These differences have shaped contemporary differences not just in iso-
lated features of the childcare or tax laws but in major, complementary ele-
ments of a system shaping the choices of families with young children.
The impact of these historical and policy variables (other than tax rates,
which influence the wage rate and family income) may help explain the puzzle
in multinational comparisons of labor supply conducted in the mid-1980s
(Layard and Mincer 1985). Within countries, labor supply of married women
seems to be explained by some of the same variables: wages and income varia-
tions, tax incentives, and family responsibilities. Yet across countries the dif-
ferences in such variables seem to have far less power. A possible resolution
of this result is that there are major long-term institutional and social protection




The Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek (OSA) data are
organized as a panel (OSA 1991) (see table 11 A.I). To utilize the OSA data,
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one can contact OSA, Van Stolkweg 14,2585 JR The Hague, The Netherlands.
For the first wave of April 1985, a random sample of two thousand households
was selected. In all households, all members between ages 16 and 65 years of
age were interviewed if they were not full-time students or military draftees.
The second and third waves took place in fall 1986 and 1988, respectively.
This study uses the 1988 wave. All respondents interviewed in the first wave
were asked to participate, and household members who had moved were in-
cluded in the sample. To counter the loss of households by nonresponse, new
households were added by the "random walk" method (i.e., a new household
from the same neighborhood was chosen). The total number of observations
in 1988 were 4,464, and the number of respondents among these who were
interviewed also in 1985 was 1,868, less than half of the respondents (OSA
1991, B15).
The wage and income variables are constructed from a question on net earn-
ings. The respondent could choose between answering net income per week,
net income per four weeks, or net income per month. To get wage per hour we
used the variable average number of hours, excluding overtime, worked per
week. The education variable is highest education completed. The Dutch edu-
cation system is derived from the "columnized" society, so there are many
parallel schools of different kinds covering the same age groups of students
but with different profiles (e.g., degree of academic achievement). We have
grouped the different educations into three groups covering as closely as pos-
sible the division into compulsory school (BO, LBO, MAVO), high school
(MBO, HAVO, VWO), and college (HBO, WO). The Dutch data do not have
any information on years of labor market experience. It turned out that the
number of family members in addition to age and age square predicts the
wages fairly well for married women (legally married plus women living in
consensual unions).
For the participation equation, we predicted net own wage for nonworkers
and used actual net wage for workers. The variable husband unemployed was
asked: Do you currently receive unemployment benefits? If the husband an-
swered this question affirmatively, the variable is equal to one and he also
answered the question, How many hours do you currently work (by zero)? A
person was considered religious if she answered that she went to church every
week or at least once a month. For child care, the person was asked, Do you
currently use child care (yes or no)?
United States
In the analysis of child care and female labor supply, we use the National
Longitudinal Youth panel (NLS/y) (see table 11 A.I). The National Longitudi-
nal Survey of Youth was designed by the Center for Human Resource Re-
search, Ohio State University, and fielded by the National Opinion Research
Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago. The NLS/y began in 1979 with
a national probability sample of subjects aged 14-21 on 1 January 1979. The358 Siv Gustafsson and Frank P. Stafford
original sample was 12,686 persons living in the United States. The respon-
dents have been reinterviewed annually.
We selected 1988 for our basis year because there was more child documen-
tation up to and including 1988 and the Dutch data also are for 1988. In order
to create our file for the wage equation and the participation equation, we had
to use variables from the following files: Keyvar 1988, Marriage 1988, Schools
for all years, CPS 1988, Common file, and Family Background 1982. The data
include women aged 23-30 in 1988. The hours variable is number of hours
worked during the survey week (R2518800). The question was phrased, How
many hours did you work last week at all jobs? The wage variable we used is
hourly rate of pay of current or most recent job (R2526010). Religious activity
is once a month or more frequent (R6556). Whether the husband is unem-
ployed is defined in the NLS/y data as husband having zero earnings. The
definition of completing high school is to have completed the twelfth grade;
the definition of college is to have completed the sixteenth grade.
Sweden
The Hushallens Ekonomiska Levnadsforhallanden (HUS) data are orga-
nized as a panel (see table 11 A. 1). The director of the HUS data is Prof. Anders
Klevmarken. People interested in analyzing the data should contact Professor
Anders Klevmarken, Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg,
Viktoriagatan 30, S-41125 Gothenburg, Sweden.
The first wave was collected in 1984. The original data include 1,184 women
and 1,114 men. In the 1984 HUS data all adult members of a select household
are interviewed if they are not in an institution. Split households are followed
in subsequent panels, and young people are added to make the cross section
representative. The second wave was collected in 1986. In 1988 the University
of Gothenburg mailed a small survey without external fundings with the most
important variables. In 1991 there was a new small survey, and for 1993 a
larger survey is again funded. The number of respondents who are in all three
panels (1984, 1986, and 1988) are 656 women and 602 men. Data from the
HUS panel have been used for analysis of separate taxation in Gustafsson
(1992c) and on childcare subsidies and labor supply in Sweden (Gustafsson
and Stafford 1992). We choose to use the 1984 HUS data because thereby we
can make use of the auxiliary data on child care and taxes that were constructed
for the two previous papers. The HUS data have very many more variables
than the more limited OSA survey.
In this paper, we attempted regressions that were as similar as possible
across the three countries. The wage variable we defined in the same way as
the Dutch variable—namely, net after tax wage at actual hours worked—and
net wage was predicted in the same way. The variable in the HUS data is
before-tax monthly income if the person receives monthly pay and before-tax
hourly wage if the person receives hourly pay. The variable was converted into
net wage by use of a tax simulation worked out for Gustafsson. The whole tax359 Three Regimes of Child Care: The U.S., the Netherlands, and Sweden
program is published (Gustafsson and Bruyn-Hundt 1991). Husband's income
after tax was calculated by the same procedure. There is a variable on whether
the person was unemployed. Among the 445 women who were younger than
age forty-five, there were fourteen unemployed husbands. There is no informa-
tion on religiosity in the Swedish data because practically no religious groups
remain in Sweden.
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